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Mystery and the evidential impact of unexplainables 
Dominik Klein & Matteo Colombo 
Abstract What’s the evidential impact of learning that something is a mystery? To answer this 
question, we first explicate the notion of a mystery in terms of unexplainability. After 
distinguishing different ways in which something can be unexplainable, we develop a test to 
evaluate the evidential impact of two distinct types of unexplainables: symmetrical and a-
symmetrical unexplainables. We argue that only a-symmetrical unexplainables have evidential 
impact. We finally clarify how our explication of mysteries as unexplainables complements existing 
accounts of abduction and contributes to the literature on the mystery of consciousness. 
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1 Introduction 
We are surrounded by mysteries. Free-will, intentionality, mental causation, personal identity and 
the origin of life: these are some of the phenomena that philosophers have called ‘mysteries.’ 
Several scientific puzzles have been characterised as mysteries too. Examples include the Big Bang, 
the asymmetry of matter and antimatter in the observable universe, the evolution of sex, the 
evolution of language, and the existence of conscious experience, which “is at once the most 
familiar thing in the world and the most mysterious” (Chalmers 1996, 3). 
 Although so many phenomena and events have been characterised as mysteries, the concept 
of a mystery remains opaque. Epistemologists and philosophers of science have paid no attention to 
questions like: What does it mean that something is a mystery? Whence does a mystery derive its 
mysteriousness? What is the evidential impact of learning that something is a mystery? Given the 
apparently widespread usage of the concept of mystery, addressing these questions should bear on 
several on-going debates in philosophy and science, and will help illuminate a neglected aspect of 
our epistemic practices. 
 In this paper, we explicate the concept of mystery in terms of unexplainability. After 
regimenting the question of how mystery should relate to credence (Section 2), we provide a 
taxonomy of mysteries as unexplainables (Section 3). We then present a test mapping these types 
into two cases—i.e., symmetric and a-symmetric unexplainables—and we argue that only a-
symmetric unexplainables have evidential impact (Section 4). We conclude by putting these results 
into a broader philosophical perspective, illustrating their significance in light of the “mystery of 
consciousness” (Section 5). 
 
2 Mysteries as unexplainables 
The term ‘mystery’ (Greek: musterion: something hidden, secret, or closed) is used in a variety of 
ways in a wide range of contexts.
1
 Generally, predicating of something that it is a mystery expresses 
                                                 
1
 Tuggy lists five different meanings of “mystery” in the literature on the doctrine of the Trinity: “[1]…a 
truth formerly unknown, and perhaps undiscoverable by unaided human reason, but which has now been 
revealed by God and is known to some… [2] something we don't completely understand… [3] some fact we 
can't explain, or can't fully or adequately explain… [4] an unintelligible doctrine, the meaning of which can't 
be grasped….[5] a truth which one should believe even though it seems, even after careful reflection, to be 
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some lack of knowledge or understanding. For example, when I say ‘String theory is a mystery to 
me’ I am expressing that I do not understand, or do not know much about string theory. When 
physicists say ‘The Big Bang poses several mysteries’, they are typically expressing that the Big 
Bang theory raises several puzzles in cosmology and astrophysics, some of which have been 
resolved while others are still awaiting a solution.  
 In particular, the term ‘mystery’ is often used to express a lack of knowledge in reply to a 
request for explanation. Suppose, for example, that Georgi asks Zhasmina why the expansion of the 
Universe has been accelerating, and Zhasmina asserts in response that the acceleration of the 
expansion of the universe is a mystery (to her). Zhasmina’s reply can plausibly be understood as 
saying that she does not possess an explanation for why the expansion of the Universe has been 
accelerating. If explanations are answers to why-questions (van Fraassen 1980; Colombo 2016; 
Skow 2016, Ch. 2), then Zhasmina is asserting that she does not possess an answer to Georgi’s 
why-question. Since “possessing an answer” is just knowing the answer, Zhasmina is asserting that 
she does not know the answer to Georgi’s why-question. She may lack relevant knowledge of 
physics and cosmology, or ignore that the Universe’s expansion is accelerating. While Zhasmina 
does not possess an answer to Georgi’s why-question, a cosmologist may possess such an answer. 
The cosmologist may not possess an answer right away, but she may acquire it with sufficient 
research, experiment, and observation. In any case, Zhasmina’s assertion in reply to Georgi’s why-
question should have no evidential impact on Georgi’s beliefs. 
 On a different understanding, however, what Zhasmina is asserting is not just that she does 
not know the answer to Georgi’s why-question. Zhasmina may be asserting that nobody presently 
possesses an explanation for why the expansion of the Universe has been accelerating. She may 
express that nobody will ever possess this explanation; or she may even express that no human can 
in principle possess this explanation, and so that no human could possibly answer Georgi’s 
question. 
 On some of these interpretations, it is not obvious that Zhasmina’s answer should have no 
evidential impact on Georgi’s beliefs, and in particular on his belief that the expansion of the 
Universe has been accelerating. After all, learning that no established theory in physics can ever 
explain this phenomenon may reasonably lead Georgi to doubt that the Universe’s expansion is 
actually accelerating. Georgi may revise his beliefs and conclude that the recorded rate of cosmic 
expansion is probably mistaken, merely apparent, or illusory. When and how, then, should learning 
Zhasmina’s answer impact Georgi’s beliefs? More generally, when and how should learning that 
something is a mystery impact one’s belief that that something is the case? 
 The tools of Bayesian epistemology offer one way to sharpen, regiment and answer these 
questions (Bovens and Hartmann 2003). Suppose that p is some proposition that you believe, and 
Prob (p) your subjective, probabilistic credence that p is the case. You are not initially ready to 
doubt that p—after all, you do believe that p. Yet, you ask “Why (or how) is it the case that p?” to a 
source Z, whom you believe to be very knowledgeable, reliable, and sincere. Z replies to you that if 
p is true at all, then why p is a mystery. In providing you with this answer, Z does not give you any 
direct information about the truth or falsity of p. The only information you receive concerns the 
mysteriousness of p in case p is true. Because in this context the term ‘mystery’ is used to express a 
                                                                                                                                                                  
impossible and/or contradictory and thus false” (Tuggy 2003, 175–6). As it will be clear, our contribution in 
this paper is focused on [3]. 
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lack of knowledge in reply to a request for explanation, we can say that if the proposition p that you 
believe is a mystery, then p, in some sense, cannot be explained,
2
 that is: p is, in some sense, 
unexplainable.
3
 
 There are several ways in which Z’s reply can impact your beliefs. Your belief about what a 
mystery is can change; your belief that the source Z is knowledgeable, reliable, and sincere can 
change; your degree of confidence in some shared background theory that governs people’s 
explanatory practice can change; and, lastly, your degree of confidence that p can change. Here we 
focus on the latter question: Should your credence in p change, after you learn that if p, why p is 
unexplainable?
4
 Put differently, the question we set out to answer is the following: Assume you 
learn that p, if true, is unexplainable without receiving any further new information about the truth 
or falsity of p. Should this lead you to (rationally) change your credence in p?  
 This question concerns a specific type of evidence that can count against some belief of 
yours. In particular, this question relates in interesting ways to the issue of whether explanatory 
considerations have confirmation-theoretic import or not, which is central to debates about the 
status of abductive reasoning (Harman 1965; van Fraassen 1989; Douven 1999; Lipton 2004).
5
 The 
basic idea underlying explications of abduction is that the explanatory success of a hypothesis with 
respect to an explanandum is part of the evidence that should lead one to raise her credence that the 
explanatory hypothesis is true (Douven 2011). However, discussions about the status of abduction 
have paid no attention to the complementary question of whether explanatory failure with respect to 
an explanandum is part of the evidence that should impact one’s degree of credence in the 
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 Our analysis does not hinge on any particular account of explanation. We assume that all explanantia are 
propositions or sets of propositions. An explanans may describe some law, argument pattern, mathematical 
proof, cause, or mechanism that offers an explanation of the explanandum of interest. We also assume that 
explananda are propositions describing phenomena, observations, or events. Explananda are not assumed to 
be true. 
3
 It may be argued that this way of setting up the problem assumes that the principle of sufficient reason is 
false. If you accept this principle, you will accept that: For every p, there must be an explanation why p is the 
case. In other words, if you accepted the principle of sufficient reason, then you should think that the 
testimony that p, if true, is a mystery implies the falsity of p. However, the connection between explainability 
and the principle of sufficient reason is in fact more complicated than this. One could consistently endorse 
the principle of sufficient reason and the claim that something is unexplainable. In a weak sense of 
unexplainability, one might say: “I endorse the PSR and so ultimately there must be an explanation of p, 
though I will never be able to explain it” (i.e., p is unexplainable for me). In a stronger sense (of an 
explanation being epistemically inaccessible to creatures like us), someone could consistently maintain: “I 
endorse the PSR and so ultimately there must be an explanation of p, though I also believe that the 
explanation is beyond human ability to discover / know / comprehend.” We are grateful to a referee for 
pointing this out to us. 
4
 We interpret the if in “If p, why…” subjunctively, as expressing that “If p is or was the case, then why or 
how so is or would be a mystery.” It should be emphasised that this statement  is not logically entailed by the 
falsity of p. 
5
 Hempel (1965) distinguishes between “explanation-seeking why-questions” and “reason-seeking why-
questions.” He writes: “An appropriate answer to the former will offer an explanation of a presumptive 
empirical phenomenon; whereas an appropriate answer to the latter will offer validating or justifying grounds 
in support of a statement… any adequate answer to an explanation-seeking question ‘Why is it the case that 
p?’ must also provide a potential answer to the corresponding epistemic question ‘What grounds are there for 
believing that p?’”(335). In the light of Hempel’s distinction, our topic can be reformulated as follows: 
Suppose that an adequate answer to an explanation-seeking why-question about p cannot be provided. Does 
this fact give us information relevant to answer the corresponding reason-seeking why-question? 
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explanandum. In what follows, we bring to the fore this question, and explicate whether and under 
what conditions it is epistemically rational to revise your credences in such a way that: 
 
Prob (p | p is unexplainable) < Prob (p) 
 
We begin by distinguishing different senses in which a proposition can be said to be unexplainable. 
It is worth pointing out that our treatment is not intended to cover all cases, in which ordinary 
people call something a ‘mystery’ in order to express their lack of knowledge about whether a 
proposition has been successfully explained, or to express, more generally, their lack of 
understanding about certain events and phenomena. Our treatment is intended to apply to some 
epistemically interesting cases, widely discussed in philosophy, theology, and science, that involve 
a modally robust notion of unexplainability. 
 
3 A taxonomy of unexplainables 
In a general sense, to say that a proposition p is unexplainable is to say that no epistemic agent in 
our world can ever adequately answer the explanation seeking question ‘Why (or how) p?’ 
 Many ordinary uses of ‘mystery’ refer to the fact that an individual or a community do not 
see a way to explain an accepted proposition p, given their current explanatory resources. Such 
resources may not conflict with p; they may even make p more likely. Because the explanatory 
resources available at that point in time fall short of providing an adequate answer to why p, p 
remains unexplained at that time. But saying that a proposition is unexplained is different from 
saying that the proposition is unexplainable. 
 Although the proposition that the tides are higher during a full moon was unexplained till 
the 1600s, it was explainable. It was, in fact, explained when Newton published his Principia 
in1687. Newton showed that the gravitational laws he provided explain, among other phenomena, 
the correlation between the behavior of the tides and the position and phase of sun and moon. So, 
given some point in time, if a proposition p does not have an adequate explanation at that time, it 
does not follow that p is unexplainable. While many ordinary uses of ‘mystery’ refer to events or 
phenomena that remain unexplained given our current resources, for our purposes we can leave this 
usage on the side, and focus on a modally more robust usage. 
 If nobody happens, has happened, and will ever happen to possess an adequate answer to the 
question ‘Why p?’, then p could be unexplainable. There are at least three cases to distinguish here. 
Just two of these cases concern the modally robust sense of unexplainability, in which we are 
interested. 
 In the first case, p remains unexplained because nobody has and will ever have the interest, 
the motivation, the curiosity, or the material and theoretical resources to find out about why p is the 
case. The proposition p is not genuinely unexplainable, but, as a matter of contingent fact, nobody 
will ever possess an answer to ‘why p?’. Thus, p will never be adequately explained. This is, of 
course, not a case of genuine unexplainability, as an adequate answer to ‘Why p?’ is actually 
epistemically accessible to creatures like us. 
 In the second case, nobody has possessed and will ever possess an adequate answer to ‘Why 
p?’, because any such answer contingently lies on one side of human cognitive capabilities. Given 
the kind of epistemic agents we are, with bounded cognitive and reasoning capacities, an adequate 
answer to the question ‘Why p?’ is epistemically inaccessible to us in this case, as this answer lies 
beyond our cognitive reach. 
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 For example, Chomsky (1975, Ch. 4; see also Hauser et al 2014) has famously argued that 
how and why our linguistic computations and representations evolved may well remain 
unexplainable to creatures like us. Another famous example includes the mystery of consciousness, 
where some have argued that the answer to the question ‘Why (or how) do brain processes produce 
conscious mental states?’ is in principle inaccessible to epistemic agents like us (McGinn 1991). If 
these authors are right in their diagnosis, then our cognitive capacities would not be fit to answer, or 
to even comprehend adequate answers to these questions. Hence, why some mental states are 
conscious, or why language evolved would forever remain unexplained to creatures like us. 
 The third case concerns answers to why questions that are epistemically inaccessible, 
because of the nature of the explananda they seek to explain. Some of these explananda correspond 
to brute phenomena or facts that have no explanation. For example, there may be no answer for why 
the laws of nature have the form they do. But if there is in fact no explanation for p, then nobody 
can answer the question ‘Why p?’6 
 Some other explananda do not correspond to brute phenomena, but are incoherent with 
some shared standard of explanatory reasoning or with some established background theory. Shared 
standards of explanatory reasoning and established background theories are routinely used by 
members of an epistemic community to ask why-questions, to answer why-questions, and, more 
generally, to distinguish adequate from inadequate explanations. 
 While explanatory standards and background theories may change over time, and may vary 
across different communities, inquirers will share at least some explanatory standard and some 
relevant background theory with their informants. These standards and background beliefs plausibly 
include the principle that contradictory propositions cannot both be true in the same sense at the 
same time, the principles that causes explain effects but not vice versa and that properties of parts 
explain aggregate properties but not vice versa, and the proposition that no event in nature can 
exceed the productive power of nature. Explananda that describe miraculous phenomena are 
obviously incoherent with these principles.
7
 When an explanandum p is incoherent with some 
shared standard of explanatory reasoning or background theory, the question ‘Why p?’ cannot be 
adequately answered given that standard or theory. 
                                                 
6
 This is the only sense of unexplainability in our taxonomy, which plausibly precludes acceptance of the 
principle of sufficient reason. It does so, because brute facts are those that have no explanation, as distinct 
from those that merely cannot possibly be explained by creatures like us. It is worth noting that people may 
rationally ask why-questions about brute facts, as they may not know that those facts are in fact brute. Even 
when people know that a fact is brute, they may still be interested in figuring out why it is brute. Sometimes, 
however, it might be misleading for us to go telling people that a fact, which is known to have no 
explanation, is a mystery. One might argue that it is misleading, because when we say that something is a 
mystery we are not merely claiming that it’s unexplainable, but also that there may be an explanation—
which could indeed not ever be knowable/comprehensible to anybody. We are grateful to a referee for 
helping us clarify these complications about the relationships between mystery, brute facts, and the principle 
of sufficient reason. 
7
 St. Thomas Aquinas (Summa Contra Gentiles, III) says: “those things are properly called miracles which 
are done by divine agency beyond the order commonly observed in nature (praeter ordinem communiter 
observatum in rebus).” This characterisation of a miracle is entailed by Hume’s famous definition that a 
miracle is “a violation of the laws of nature” (Hume 1748/2000). Voltaire (1764/1901, p. 272) provides a 
stronger definition of a miracle as “the violation of mathematical, divine, immutable, eternal laws. By the 
very exposition itself, a miracle is a contradiction in terms: a law cannot at the same time be immutable and 
violated.” 
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 In short, there are a variety of reasons that may underly the modally robust sense of 
unexplainability we are interested in. These roughly fall in two classes. In the first class, 
unexplainability is due to the subject matter of p and its relation to us as epistemic agents.  
Unexplainables in this class might describe a brute fact, or some topic whose explanation is 
inaccessible to epistemic agents like us. The second class contains those cases, where  
unexplainability is  triggered by the explanandum’s relation to relevant explanatory standards and 
background beliefs. Unexplainables in this class might, for example, be logically incoherent, as the 
laws of logic are part of the background standards, or violate the principle that nothing comes from 
nothing. 
 
4 Unexplainables and credence 
There is a simple test that distinguishes two, modally robust types of unexplainability. Recall that 
your reliable, knowledgeable, and sincere source Z informs you about the unexplainability of p 
while remaining silent about the truth value of p. The information you receive is that: 
 
(a) If p is true, then ‘Why p?’ is unanswerable. 
 
Since p is a proposition, we can form its negation not-p, and ask ‘Why not-p?’ Z could give you this 
answer: 
 
 (b) If not-p is true, then ‘Why not-p?’ is unanswerable. 
 
Depending on the content of p, there may or may not be a connection between the statements (a) 
and (b) as asserted by Z.
8
 
 To illustrate, suppose that you acquired the belief that there is more landmass on the 
northern hemisphere of planet Earth than on its southern hemisphere. You’re not ready to doubt it, 
but you want to know why that is the case. Assume that a knowledgeable and sincere source tells 
you that the question ‘Why is there more landmass on the northern than on the southern 
hemisphere?’ is in principle unanswerable. Nobody may ever explain why the majority of land mass 
is in the northern hemisphere. If this question is unanswerable, also the converse of the question 
will be unanswerable: even if it held true, nobody would ever be able to explain why it is not the 
case that the majority of land mass is in the northern hemisphere. In short, the content of the 
explanandum proposition allows for a symmetry in unexplainability; and a knowledgeable, reliable 
and sincere source should be prepared to assert both (a) and (b). 
 For the other extreme, consider instead some other proposition such as the proposition that 
Jesus materially turned water into wine at the marriage of Cana. Many people believe that this 
proposition is true, though it apparently clashes with some of their fundamental theoretical and 
logical commitments. While they do not doubt it, they are also ready to inquire for an explanation: 
‘Why or how is it that Jesus did that?’ Not only all knowledgeable chemists, but also most lay 
people—including many that believe that proposition—will subscribe to the statement that ‘If it is 
true that Jesus transformed water into wine at the marriage of Cana, then that is unexplainable.’ 
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 Recall again that we read the “if p…” subjunctively. In particular, there is no logical connection between 
(a) and (b). 
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However, few people would be prepared to support the corresponding assertion (b), that ‘If it is not 
true that Jesus transformed water into wine, then why so is unexplainable.’ The content of p is such 
that there is an asymmetry between (a) and (b). If p is true, then why or how p is unexplainable. But 
if not-p is true, then why or how so is not unexplainable, since an answer to this question coheres 
with a shared standard of explanatory reasoning like the principle that no event in nature can exceed 
the productive power of nature. So, in this case, a knowledgeable, sincere and reliable source should 
be prepared to assert (a) but not (b). 
 The upshot is that the question ‘If not-p were true, would not-p be unexplainable?’ allows us 
to distinguish between two classes of unexplainables: symmetric unexplainables, where both p and 
not-p, if true, are unexplainable, and asymmetric unexplainables, where only p is unexplainable. 
 These two classes map to the distinction between the two cases of genuine unexplainability 
we identified above. When the unexplainability of p  is due to limitations of humans’ cognitive 
capacities, then these limitations hinge on the subject matter of p, not its truth value. If  p, if true, is 
unexplainable, then also not-p is and we have a symmetry between (a) and (b). Instead, when the 
unexplainability of a proposition does not depend on limitations of cognitive capacities but on 
logical and explanatory relations between the proposition and some shared explanatory standard or 
background belief, then this cannot at the same time be true of not-p. If p is logically or 
explanatorily incoherent with some shared explanatory standard or background belief, then not-p is 
tautological given that standard or background belief. And if both p and not-p simultaneously 
conflict with some shared explanatory standard or background belief, then the latter must be 
internally inconsistent or explanatorily incoherent.
9
 In short, symmetric unexplainables correspond 
to subject matters inaccessible to epistemic beings like us while asymmetryic unexplainables arise 
from an incompatibility between p and some relevant reasoning standard or background belief. 
 
4.1 How should unexplainables impact your credences? 
The symmetric-asymmetric distinction is relevant to addressing how you should update your 
credence in p after learning that p is unexplainable. Armed with the tools of Bayesian epistemology, 
we posit that a rational agent’s credence function Prob( ) satisfies the axioms of probability, and 
that agents’ belief update is carried out via Bayesian conditionalization. Rational agents’ credences 
should be such that their probabilities of mutually exclusive propositions should sum up to at most 
one, and mutually incompatible propositions should receive a joint probability of zero. 
 Consider asymmetric unexplainables. Let us denote the set of relevant standards of 
explanatory reasoning and background theories by S, where S is a conjunction of many, 
interrelated, individual propositions. The information that ‘If p is true, then why or how p is 
unexplainable’ yet that it is not the case that ’ If not-p is true, then why or how not-p is 
unexplainable’ entails  that we are in the second of the two classes we distinguished above. The 
unexplainability of p cannot be grounded   in the  subject matter of p and in its relation to us as 
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 In the case of logical inconsistency, this is related to a well-known principle of classical logic. Whenever 
we can derive a contradiction from a set of propositions F together with p and we can derive a contradiction 
from F together with not-p, then we can derive a contradiction from F alone.  So if both p and not-p are 
contradictory with F, then F must be internally inconsistent. The argument roughly goes as follows. Assume 
F. By logical reasoning, either p or not-p must be true. If p is true, we have F and p, which, we assumed, 
together derive a contradiction. If not-p is true, we have F and not-p which again derive a contradiction 
together. Thus, assuming F, we can always derive a contradiction. This exactly says that F is inconsistent. In 
case of incoherence, a similar argument applies. 
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epistemic agents alone. Rather, the unexplainability of p is grounded in its relationship to S. 
Learning that if p is true, then why so is unexplainable, conveys the information that p and S are 
mutually incompatible, or at least, that p is very unlikely given S. By the laws of probability, the 
agent should revise her credences in light of this information, in such a way that the conjunction p 
& S gets assigned a probability of zero,
10
 that is: 
 
Prob (p & S| p is unexplainable) = 0 
 
Where Prob (x| p is unexplainable) stands for the probability of x after revising with the new 
information that p is unexplainable. By the same argument, the revision will have to ensure that the 
probabilities of p and S sum up to at most one, since p and S are mutually exclusive: 
 
Prob (p | p is unexplainable) + Prob (S | p is unexplainable) ≤ 1 
 
 If we turn our attention to your prior credences, then it seems plausible that, before being 
informed about the unexplainability of p, you should have a high degree of credence in S. After all, 
S consists of background standards and theories deeply engrained in processes of explanatory 
reasoning that allow you to ask, answer, and reason about why-questions. Furthermore, your prior 
credence in p should be sufficiently high. After all, if you already disbelieved that p, then it would 
be unlikely that you will inquire about why p. Together these two considerations imply that your 
prior credences are such that: 
 
Prob (p) + Prob (S) > 1         (1) 
 
 One independent way to see why this should hold is through a threshold theory of belief. If t 
is a fixed threshold for converting probabilistic credences into belief simpliciter, then you believe p 
(simpliciter) if and only if Prob(p) > t.
11
 for some t > 0.5. Assume that you believe (simpliciter) in 
your background theory S, that is: Prob(S) > t. If you enquire about p, you will most probably also 
believe p, hence Prop(p) > t. Hence  Prop(p) + Prop(S) > 2t >1, thus validating(1).  But of course, 
your reason for asking might be that you are somewhat suspicious about p. In that case, you might 
prefer to suspend judgment about p, prior to your question i.e. you neither belief p nor not-p. The 
latter implies that Prob(not-p) < t and hence Prob(p) > 1-t. But then again we get that 
Prop(p)+Prop(S) > t+1-t = 1, in line with (1). The only case where  the sum of Prob(S) and 
Prob(p) is smaller or equal to 1 is when you actively disbelieve p, you believe that not-p.  In all 
other cases, in particular when suspending judgment about p, the sum Prob(S) + Prob(p) will be 
strictly larger than 1. Since it seems plausible that epistemically rational agents would typically 
                                                 
10 For simplicity, we focus on the case where p and S are incompatible. Where p is  highly improbable given 
S, i.e., Prob (p|S & p is unexplainable.) ≈ 0, a similar analysis applies. By Bayes’s theorem, we have that 
Prob (p | S & p is unexplainable) = Prob(p & S| p is unexplainable)/Prob(S| p is unexplainable). 
 Since the denominator of the right hand side is smaller than one, the left side can only be close to zero if 
also the nominator of the right side is. Thus, upon learning  that Prob (p|S & p is unexplainable) ≈ 0, revision 
has to ensure at least that Prob (p &S | p is unexplainable) ≈ 0. This triggers very much the same arguments 
as the case “Prob (p &S | p is unexplainable) = 0” treated here. 
11
 The existence of such a threshold follows, e.g., from the Lockean Thesis of belief (Leitgeb 2014). 
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refrain from asking the question ‘Why p?’ to a knowledgeable, reliable, and sincere source if they 
actively believe p be false, the assumption is justified that: 
 
Prob (p) + Prob (S) > 1 
 
 In this way, learning that p and S are mutually incompatible (or that p is very unlikely given 
S) should lead epistemically rational agents to revise their degrees of credence to ensure that: 
 
Prob (p | p is unexplainable) + Prob (S | p is unexplainable) ≤ 1 
 
Such revision can be done by reducing your credence in S, the credence in p, or both. 
 When should you revise your credence in S? Let us stipulate that your inquiry ‘Why p?’ is 
not the first explanatory question you ask. Plausibly, you have engaged in a significant number of 
explanatory endeavours before, along with other members of your community. Since your 
explanatory standards and background theories S have played some role in many of these 
endeavours allowing you to successfully acquire answers to several why-questions, it will be 
reasonable for you not to give up your credence in S too easily. After all, many of your current 
beliefs have been acquired by relying on these standards of explanatory reasoning and background 
theories. The standards and theories are so implicated with many of the things that you believe that 
to abandon them would be to give up on or jeopardise many propositions that you currently take to 
be true. Revising your credence in S may then trigger a significant amount of epistemic labour, 
involving far reaching epistemic reassessment and possible epistemic losses. It is surely reasonable 
not to revise S too easily, given that far less radical alternatives are available (Quine 1951). 
 Another reason why you should not give up S too easily is that you share these reasoning 
standards and background theories with other members of your epistemic community. It is the 
social character of these epistemic standards and theories that allows you and other members of 
your community to engage in joint explanatory endeavors. So, decreasing your credence in S will 
compromise future, joint explanatory inquiries with members of your epistemic community in 
default of a new set of shared standards or background theories. Thus, the social embedding of S 
provides additional reason not to lower your credence in S. 
 Lastly, the facts that S is shared with other members of your community and governs your 
explanatory practices bear on how firm your belief in S should be. If members of your community 
have relied on S to acquire many beliefs and in particular many new explanations, then the 
epistemic adequacy of S and of its individual elements should have been already extensively tested. 
Whenever members of your epistemic community evaluated the quality of an explanation acquired 
through S, they have put under test the reliability of S or of some of its elements. To the extent that 
S successfully passes this kind of testing time and again, belief in S becomes firmer. It would then 
be unreasonable to significantly revise your firm belief in S, rather than revising credence in p, after 
you learn that the latter belief of yours is incoherent with S (cf. Skyrms 1980). 
 While these considerations should make you cautious to lower your credence in S, we rely 
on a weaker assumption in our analysis of how unexplainability should impact credence. We allow 
that, after learning that p is unexplainable, you may lower your credence in S, as long as not all 
weight of revision is borne by S. Plausibly, at least some weight should be borne by your belief that 
p, which justifies the conclusion that: 
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Prob (p | p is unexplainable) < Prob (p) 
 
We note that this result follows even if one rejects that S has any special epistemic status different 
from p such that one should be cautious in revising the credence in S. Several belief revision 
policies would prescribe to lower your credence in p upon learning that p is unexplainable, even 
when S is not granted special epistemic status. 
 Take normalization. This belief revision policy prescribes that the weight of revision should 
be borne equally by Prob(p) and Prob(S): 
Prob (p|p is a mystery) =  
and likewise for S. Since we assume the denominator of the right side, Prob(p) + Prob(S) to be 
larger than 1, it follows that Prob(p | p is a mystery) < Prob(p). So, normalization prescribes to 
lower your credence in p upon learning that p is unexplainable. 
 In summary, the asymmetry in the pattern of responses that the source Z should give to the 
questions of ‘Why p?’ vs. ‘Why not-p?’ brings to the fore a conflict between p and some shared 
background theory or explanatory standard S. This conflict provides you with evidence, which bears 
on the truth value of p. This evidence should at least lead you to lower your credence that p. 
 Let’s finally turn our attention to symmetric unexplainables. In this case, a knowledgeable, 
reliable and sincere source is prepared to assert that both p and not-p, if true, are unexplainable. 
Hence, learning about the unexplainability of p does not inform you about some incompatibility 
between p and S
12
; and hence does not provide you with evidence to reduce credence in p. 
 As explained above, examples of the symmetric kind of unexplainability may include 
explananda such as the proposition that there is more landmass on the northern hemisphere of 
planet Earth than on its southern hemisphere, and the propositions that human linguistic 
computations and representations emerged from a uniquely human genetic endowment (Hauser et al 
2014) and that consciousness emerges purely from brain activity (McGinn 1991). The explanandum 
proposition in these examples is neither self-contradictory, nor is it seemingly incoherent with some 
other shared standard of explanation or background theory. Where the unexplainability of a 
proposition p depends on limitations of human epistemic reach, your source’s pattern of responses 
will not provide you with new evidence about the truth value of p, and so your credences should 
remain unchanged. After all, finding an answer to the question ‘Why p?’ and finding an answer to 
the question ‘Why not-p?’ would be equally hard epistemic tasks. Both answers would be equally 
epistemically inaccessible to us. Due to this symmetry, the information that p, if true, is 
unexplainable is unrelated to the truth value of p. If the unexplainability of p is unrelated to its truth 
value, you will have no reason to revise your prior credence that p. 
 
5 The mystery of consciousness 
Our discussion so far has offered an explication of mystery in terms of unexplainability, and an 
argument that, in some specific cases, learning that something is unexplainable should have 
                                                 
12
 S cannot, on pain of inconsistency,  be incompatible with both p and not-p. For if it was, it would be the 
case that   both, S&p and S&not-p entail a contradiction. By classical logical reasoning, then also  S&(p v 
not-p) entails a contradiction. But since (p v not-p) is a tautology, this is equivalent to saying that S alone 
entails a contradiction, i.e. S is inconsistent. The argument for the case that p and not-p are merely highly 
improbable, given S is similar.  
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evidential impact. We conclude by clarifying how these results matter to several ongoing debates in 
philosophy. 
 The question addressed by this paper is closely related to issues about the nature and 
rationality of abduction, which assigns a special confirmation-theoretic import to explanatory 
considerations. In the last decades, the debate has focused on whether explanatory success is a 
(defeasible) mark of truth (Harman 1965; Van Fraassen 1989; Lipton 2004). No attention has 
instead been paid to the related questions of whether and under which conditions explanatory 
failure is a (defeasible) mark of falsehood. If our analysis of unexplainability is right, then there is a 
connection between persistent explanatory failure and falsehood. Specifically, we should lower our 
credence in propositions that we have reason to believe present an a-symmetric unexplainability. 
The case of consciousness illustrates this point. 
 McGinn (1991) claims that consciousness is a mystery
13
 because we humans are simply not 
equipped to find an explanation for why or how brain states and activity give rise to conscious 
experience (see also Chomsky 1975). The point is not that the existence of consciousness would 
breach accepted standards of explanatory reasoning, neither is the point that consciousness cannot 
be given a functional characterisation. The point is that we humans lack the conceptual repertoire 
necessary for answering questions about the relation between properties of the brain and conscious 
experience. But if we lack these cognitive resources, then both the proposition that there is some 
neural property N such that N produces conscious experience, and the proposition that there is no 
neural property N such that N produces conscious experience will remain unexplainable. Possible 
facts about the relation between certain neural properties and consciousness will be epistemically 
inaccessible to us humans as are facts about the relation between the property of having a mass and 
inertia to pigs. We would face a case of symmetric unexplainability, where both p and not-p would 
remain unexplainable to us. If this is right, and because of this kind of epistemic inaccessibility, our 
prior credence in the proposition that there is some neural property N such that N produces 
conscious experience should not be affected by the new information that that proposition is 
unexplainable. 
 Chalmers’s (1996) diagnosis for the mysteriousness of consciousness differs from 
McGinn’s. According to Chalmers, consciousness is a mystery because of its incoherence with 
widely shared standards that govern our epistemic and explanatory practices. Consciousness cannot 
be explained like any other complex property (e.g., genetic dominance or inflation) in terms of 
physically realized functional properties, because it cannot be captured in physical or functional 
terms. Consciousness would depend on non-physical properties; and so, knowing all physical facts 
would not suffice for knowing everything there is to know to answer any why-question about 
consciousness. Furthermore, since consciousness cannot be reduced to physical properties, its 
explanation would be incoherent with the principle of the causal closure of the physical, according 
to which every event that has a cause has a physical cause. If this type of incoherence (with 
functionalism, physicalism, and the causal closure of the world) is the source of mysteriousness for 
consciousness, then the proposition that there is some neural property N such that N produces 
conscious experience, and the proposition that there is no neural property N such that N produces 
conscious experience are not equally unexplainable. The former but not the latter coheres with 
shared standards of explanatory reasoning, and we would face an instance of asymmetric 
                                                 
13
 Strictly speaking, consciousness itself isn’t mysterious in our sense because it’s not a proposition. 
 12 
unexplainability. If this is right, then our prior credence in the proposition that there is no neural 
property N such that N produces conscious experience should be lowered after learning that this 
proposition is unexplainable. Put bluntly, learning that there is a genuine explanatory gap in 
consciousness studies gives us reason to be sceptical about the existence of irreducible qualia. 
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